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## CHILDHOOD OF HUMAN DIGNITY\*

### ABSTRACT

At no other time has the keen search for common humanity, and the practice that follows such an assumption, been as urgent and imperative as it is now. In the era of globalization, the cause and the politics of shared humanity face the most fateful among the many fateful steps they have taken in their long history.

For all its flaws and inadequacies, Korczak's practice of engaged conversation of partners who in the course of talking and listening help each other into equality may be seen, after the years, as a laboratory in which the roads to humanity had been experimented with, researched, and mapped. To say that Korczak added a few (even a crucial few) weapons to our pedagogical armoury while recommending to decommission some others means to grossly underestimate the significance of his legacy. Korczak wished to protect children's dignity not for the sake of the happy childhood alone, but also for the sake of those adults in whom children would eventually turn. Children's dignity is the childhood of human dignity. Human dignity has no other childhood and nowhere else to take root, grow and self-assert.

**Key words:** Arendt, H.; childhood; dignity; humanity; humiliation; Korczak, J.; Lyotard, F.; Rosenzweig, F.; Wajda, A.; Warsaw Ghetto.

Of human child (and are we not all human children?!) François Lyotard wrote:

Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the objects of its interest, not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to common reason, the child is eminently the human because its distress heralds and promises the things possible.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel Bowlby, Polity Press 1991, pp. 2–7.

Being a child means: everything may yet happen. Nothing is yet out of reach, nothing has been irretrievably lost. The world has no limits—and if it has, there is no knowing what they are nor where they lie. Any desire stands the same chance of fulfilment as the next: among the abundance of untested chances, calculation of costs and effects makes little sense. The roads are plentiful, they all wait to be tried and explored, just like their destinations and the traffic rules. Being a child means no past that irrevocably binds, curbs and holds captive beyond redemption—and a lot of the future that unties and sets free. No fixed address—but an open, and permanently valid, ticket. Being a child means: infinity of possibilities.

Elsewhere<sup>2</sup>, Lyotard observes: childhood is the philosophers' nightmare: Bundle of possibilities? Hesitating over the objects of its interest? Not sensitive to common reason? This is exactly what the philosophical crusade has been waged against since it started, so that clarity and *Eindeutigkeit* would rule the world and reason would, at long last, become fully and truly common. But childhood is also the philosophers' accomplice. Indefatigably, ever again, childhood tells the philosophers that humanity is not given—not matter-of-factly, not ready-made for instant use. It tells them though by the same token that humanity is only (only?) a possibility—dormant, waiting to be awakened. And so it keeps philosophers busy, since there is a lot in the world to be done and so a lot for them to do.

Possibility must be guided and ushered into reality; it must be prompted (convinced, cajoled, forced) to stop being a possibility. That assistance is called education, formation, *Bildung*. The purpose of that assistance is maturation: the end of childhood. To be human, one needs first to stop being a child. For a fully-fledged, "mature" human, to be called "childish" is a snub, offence or a censure. The adult is what the child is not. The most precious possibility among the many that the educators should struggle to lift out of its hiding, is the denial and renouncement of childhood. When that happens, the disturbingly vast spectrum of options will be tapered to just one, straight and narrow path. One life course will be selected and followed, drawing the sacrosanct, and dear to the hearts of the order-guardians and the philosophers alike, boundary between reality and fantasy. The position of that line will be learned and memorised, and the line will be never trespassed.

In that process, something is gained: the ability to set apart the *comme il faut* from *comme il n'est faut pas*, the approved from the frowned upon, the "you must do it" or "you can get away with it" from the "beware of doing it" and "you can do it only at your own peril". Peace and quiet is gained—brought by submission, compliance, humility and meekness; by learning one's place and sticking to it, whatever the temptation to look elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, *Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants*, Galilée 1988, p. 148.

In that process, something is also lost. The courage to say “no” and to resist taking things as they are. The nobility to refuse the carrot and ignore the stick. The dignity of the refusal to be pushed around, bulldozed, browbeaten, bullied. Human dignity.

It is said that children, like fish, should be seen but not heard. This is, anyway, what the adults say—wishing children to be more like they, the adults, have become once they grew used to be watched and to keep silent.

### **DIGNITY IS THE HUMANITY OF THE HUMANS**

Half century ago, in my student years, I was presented with two models of the way in which human learning proceeds. Teachers preferring the “reinforcement” model spoke of rats; the others, advocates of “conditioned reflexes” model spoke of dogs. Despite my teachers’ insistence on a principal difference between their theories, it is the similarities between them that struck me as blatant as they were off-putting. The “conditioned reflex” theory, as if made to the measure of the world of central planning, ubiquitous control and total regulation, cast limelight on the manager who manipulated the laboratory routine, and—through it—the conduct of laboratory dogs. The “reinforcement” theory, which reflected for a change the “free chooser’s” mentality of a market society, hid the manager in the wings, casting instead the laboratory rats in the role of pleasure-seeking actors. The overall image of the way the living creatures’ minds or impulses work was however amazingly similar. Whether the world was purposefully designed and made to order, or whether it came into being by its own inscrutable ways as a resultant of the actors’ uncoordinated actions, to survive in that world meant to learn its immovable structures and irresistible rules. The “reinforcers” assured: learning the rules and obeying them will pay; it is in the learner’s interests to learn, while failing to learn will cost the slothful dearly. The advocates of “conditioned reflexes” kept silent about the prizes; in this world you are bound to learn, and learn you will, however tasty and nutritious, or lean and bitter, the consequences. But whether other-directed or self-directed the learners were, whether they sought gratification and pleasure or nothing in particular, moving through the world was a one way street with a simple choice: follow it or perish.

Neither of the two schools had anything to say about dignity. But then dogs and rats know not of dignity. Dignity is human invention. Dignity is the humanity of the humans.

In one scene of Andrzej Wajda’s most human of films, Janusz Korczak, the most human of film heroes, is reminded of the horrors of the wars waged in the life-time of his much suffering generation. He remembers them, of course, and deeply resents and abhors—as acts of inhumanity deserve to be resented and ought be abhorred. And yet most vividly, and with greatest horror, he remembers a drunk man kicking a child.

Let us think.

We tend to measure the inhumanity of wars by the number of their casualties. We tend to measure the evil, offensiveness, infamy of victimisation by the number of its victims. And yet in 1944, in the midst of the most murderous of wars human beings ever waged, Ludwig Wittgenstein noted:

No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one man.

Or again, no torment can be greater than what a single human being may suffer.

The whole planet can suffer no greater torment than a single soul.<sup>3</sup>

Half a century later, when pressed by Leslie Stahl of the CBS about half million children who died because of the US continuous military blockade of Iraq, Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the United Nations, did not deny the charge and admitted that “this was a difficult choice to take”. But she justified that choice: “we think that the price was worth paying”.<sup>4</sup> Albright, let us be fair, was not alone in following that kind of reasoning. “You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs” is the favourite excuse of the visionaries, the spokesmen for the officially endorsed visions, and the warlords alike. That formula has turned over the years into the veritable motto of our brave modern times.

Whoever are those “we” who “think” and in whose name Albright spoke, it is exactly their kind of judgment whose cold cruelty Wittgenstein opposed and by which Korczak was shocked, outraged and revolted, making a life out of his revulsion. A senseless suffering and a senselessly afflicted pain bear no excuse and would not stand in any court. But starving or causing death of just one human being is not, cannot be, a “price worth paying” for however “sensible” or even noble the cause may be for which payment is made. Neither humiliation or denial of human dignity can be such a price. Because not only the dignified life and respect due to the humanity of human being combine into the supreme value that cannot be outweighed or compensated for by any volume or any amount of other values, but all other values are values only in as far as they serve human dignity and promote its cause. All things valuable in human life are but so many different means to that one value that makes life worth living.

Denial of dignity discredits the worth of any cause that need such denial to self-assert. And suffering of one child discredits that worth as radically and completely as the suffering of millions. What may be true for omelettes, becomes a cruel lie when applied to human happiness and well-being.

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<sup>3</sup> Edward T. Oakes (ed.), *German Essays on Religion*, Continuum 1994, pp. 224–5.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted after Arundhati Roy, “Ben Laden, secret de famille de l’Amérique”, *Le Monde*, 14–15 October 2001.

**NOT SURVIVAL AT ALL COST, BUT LIFE OF DIGNITY IS THE VALUE**

It is commonly accepted that the key to Korczak's thoughts and deeds was his love of children. Such interpretation is well grounded; Korczak's love was passionate and unconditional, complete and all-embracing—enough to sustain a whole life of unique sense and integrity. And yet like all interpretation this interpretation stops short of the completeness of its object. Korczak loved children like few of us are ready or capable to love—but what he loved in children was their humanity. Humanity at its best—undistorted, un-truncated, un-maimed, whole in its inchoation and nascency, full of yet-un-betrayed promise and yet-uncompromised potential. The world into which the potential carriers of humanity are born and in which they grow know to be more adept to the clipping of wings than to the prompting them to spread, it is only in children that humanity can be found, caught and preserved pristine and whole.

It would be perhaps better to change the world's habits and make human habitat more hospitable to human dignity, so that coming of age would not require the compromising of child's humanity. Young Henryk Goldszmit shared in the hopes of the century in which he was born and did believe that changing the world's abominable habits was in human power: a task both feasible and bound to be attained. As times went by, as the stacks of the victims of ill or noble intentions alike grew sky-high, and as the necrosis and putridity of the flesh in which dreams were turned left less and less to imagination—such elevated hopes were plucked of their credibility. Old Doctor Janusz Korczak knew all too well the uncomfortable truth of which Henryk Goldszmit did not and could not know: there can be no shortcuts to the world made to the measure of human dignity, while the world that people shorn of their dignity and unused to respect human dignity of others construct daily is unlikely to be remade to that measure.

On this world, you cannot legislate perfection. You cannot force, but neither can you persuade this world to behave, and to be virtuous. You cannot make this world kind and considerate to the humans who inhabit it, and as accommodating to their dreams of dignity as you would ideally wish it to be. But you must try. You will try. You would, at any rate, if you were that Janusz Korczak who grew out of Henryk Goldszmit.

But how would you? By protecting that dignity with which every human is born against being stolen or twisted, and doing it when there is still time—in that dignity's childhood; as the English would say—by locking the stable before the horse bolted. And how to achieve that? By sheltering children from the poisonous effluvia of the world tainted and corrupted by human humiliation and indignity. By barring access to the law of that jungle which starts just on the other side of the shelter's door. When his orphanage moved from its pre-war Krochmalna location to the Ghetto, Korczak ordered that the entry door be permanently closed and the ground-floor windows be bricked up. When the immi-

nent deportation to gas chamber became a certainty Korczak opposed the idea to close the orphanage and send children out to seek individually a chance of escape: when out, they will learn fear, abasement and hatred. They will lose the most precious of values—their dignity—and once robbed of that value, what point in staying alive? The value, remember, is life of dignity, not survival at all cost.

### **TO RESPECT AND TO TEACH RESPECT OF THAT DIGNITY WHICH HUMAN BEINGS DESERVE FOR BEING HUMAN**

Spielberg could learn something from Korczak that he did not know, or did not wish to know, or did not wish to admit that he knew—something about human life and such values as make that life worth living—something the ignorance of which, and disregard of he displayed in the *Schindler's List* to the applause of the world that has little use of dignity but much demand for humiliation and that came to see the purpose of life in outliving others.

And so the point is to insure children against the thieves eager to steal their humanity . . . Having never met a thief and never heard of one, the child will have retained trust in other people nobility and believe their good intentions: the child may come to respect in other people what it came to respect in itself. Into the adult world it will enter, the child may bring its own dignity unscathed and unpolluted. And the world populated by dignified people would be, surely, a world hospitable to human dignity.

It certainly would. There was a flaw, though, in Korczak's plan. Try to implement it—and you will surely come against a twofold trouble.

First: however hard you try to protect children against the world, you cannot shelter them all. There are just too many of them—undernourished, emaciated, without drinking water, medical care, school, prospects, hope. Too many driven to the wall and to desperation, knowing little love but a lot of insult and indignity, learning no kindness but drilled to hate and taught that survival is a zero-sum game. When in Wajda's film Korczak is told of children in other ghetto's orphanages having been robbed, exploited and abandoned, he pleads: I have my own two hundred, I cannot take care of them all . . . Yet his face betrays the limpness of the excuse. In the face of children's suffering, 'I cannot' is frail apology. Impotence is a rebuke, doing nothing to redress it is a moral condemnation. And so Janusz Korczak cannot just dismiss Henryk Goldszmit's resolve. One needs perhaps to do something about the organised crime of dignity-theft out there in the world, in order to cut down the number of children in need of care, succour and caress to the size of human ability to give them . . .

And second: short of doing something about that big issue, closing the door and shutting the windows may prove in the long run a disservice to tomorrow adults . . . Facing a cruel, indifferent and deceitful world while having been brought up to expect a benign, caring and trustful one may break many a spine

and confuse many a mind. Worse still—callousness would hurt yet more painfully those who have grown used to a ready, constant and abundant supply of love; cold winds out there may freeze many a greenhouse-bred flower. Is it not rather the warden's duty to prepare the wards for a world in which survival, not human dignity is the name of the game? A catch-as-you-catch-can world? A world in which getting on top, not being together, and certainly not being for each other, makes the difference between success and failure?

These are genuine dilemmas, and they posit questions with no good answers. Korczak was painfully aware that his own answer was, at the utmost, a second best, perhaps even merely a choice of lesser evil, possibly an act of despair . . . If you cannot do what you feel/know needs to be done, at least do what you do can?

What you can do is to respect and breed respect in others around you: to respect and to teach respect of that dignity which human beings deserve for being human—bouquets of forever-not-yet-fully-opened flowers, each of a unique hue and one only fragrance. Human dignity is a tender plant that wilts and fades unless fed daily with the respect that shows in the will to listen. It is also, however, an intelligent and sensitive plant. It grows and blossoms when spoken to. Korczak spoke to children—and by listening to them he made them speak.

The world is not humane just because it is made by human beings, and it does not become humane just because the human voice sounds in it, but only when it has become the object of discourse . . . We humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human.

### **THE SEARCH FOR COMMON HUMANITY IN THE WORLD DENYING THE PARTNER-IN-THE-DIALOGUE DIGNITY**

The Greeks called this humanness which is achieved in the discourse of friendship *philanthropia*, “love of man”, since it manifests itself in a readiness to share the world with other men.

The above words of Hannah Arendt<sup>5</sup> could be—should be—read as prolegomena to all future efforts aimed at arresting the reverse drift and bringing the world closer to the ideal of “human community”. Following Gottlieb Ephraim Lessing, her intellectual hero, Arendt avers that “openness to others” is “the precondition of ‘humanity’ in every sense of the word... [T]ruly human dialogue differs from mere talk or even discussion in that it is entirely permeated by pleasure in the other person and what he says”.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing”, in *Men in Dark Times*, Harcourt Brace & Company 1983, pp. 24–5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

It was the great merit of Lessing, in Arendt's view, that "he was glad for the sake of the infinite number of opinions that arise when men discuss the affairs of this world". Lessing rejoiced in the very thing that has ever—or at least since Parmenides and Plato—distressed philosophers: that the truth, as soon as it is uttered, is immediately transformed into one opinion among many, is contested, reformulated, reduced to one subject of discourse among others. Lessing's greatness does not merely consist in a theoretical insight that there cannot be one single truth within the human world but in his gladness that it does not exist and that, therefore, the unending discourse among men will never cease as long as there are men at all. A single absolute truth...would have been the death of all those disputes...[a]nd this would have spelled the end of humanity.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that others disagree with us (they do not hold dear what we do but instead hold dear what we don't; they believe that human togetherness to benefit from would be based on other rules than such as we consider superior; above all, they doubt and question our claim to a hotline to absolute truth and so our bid to know for sure, before the debate started, where it must end) is not an obstacle on the road to human community. But our conviction that our opinions are the whole truth, nothing but the truth and above all the sole truth that there is, and our belief that other people's truths, if different from ours, are "mere opinions"—are such an obstacle.

Her essay on "Humanity in Dark Times" Arendt concludes with a quotation from Lessing: "Jeder sage, was ihm Wahrheit dünkt,/und die Wahrheit selbst sei Gott empfohlen" [Let each man say what he deems truth,/and let truth itself be commended unto God']<sup>8</sup>. Lessing/Arendt message is quite straightforward. Commending the truth to God means leaving the question of truth (the question of "who is right") open to the humans. The truth may only emerge at the far end of conversation—and in a genuine conversation (that is, a conversation that is not a soliloquy in disguise, nor succession of monologues) no partner is certain to know, nor is able to know in advance what that end may be (if there is to be an end, that is). Speaker, and also a thinker who thinks in a "speaking mode" cannot, as Franz Rosenzweig points out, "does not anticipate anything; he must be able to wait because he depends on the word of the other; he requires time".<sup>9</sup> And as Nathan Glatzer, Rosenzweig's most acute scholar, suggests—there is "a curious parallel" between Rosenzweig's model of a thinker in the "speaking mode" and William James's processual/dialogical concept of truth: "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes truth, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of the verifying itself, its verification. Its

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 26–7.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Franz Rosenzweig, *Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A View of World, Man and God*, Harvard University Press 1999, p. 14.



validity is the process of its validation.”<sup>10</sup> Indeed, affinity is striking—though for Rosenzweig the speech earnestly and hopefully engaged in a dialogue, a speech unsure-of-the-result-of-the-dialogue and therefore unsure-of-its-own-truth, is the principal substance of the “event” in which truth is “made”, and the principal tool of “making” it.

Truth is an eminently agonistic concept; it is born of the confrontation between beliefs resistant to reconciliation, and between believers unwilling to compromise. Short of such a confrontation, the idea of “truth” would have hardly occurred in the first place. “Knowing how to go on”, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested, would be all one needed to know—and the setting in which one needs “to go on”, unless challenged and thus made “unfamiliar” and shaken out of its “self-evidence”, tends to come complete with the unambiguous prescription for “going on”. Disputing truth starts as a response to the “cognitive dissonance”. It is prompted by the urge to devalue and disempower another reading of the setting and/or another prescription for acting, whose very presence casts doubt on one’s own reading and one’s own action routine. That urge to denigrate and dismiss will grow in intensity the more vociferous and difficult to stifle the objections/obstacles become. After all, the prime stake in disputing the truth, and the primary purpose of the self-assertion, is the proof that the partners/ adversaries are in the wrong and that therefore their objections are invalid and may be disregarded.

When it comes to disputing truth, chances for an “undistorted communication” as postulated by Jürgen Habermas are for that reason slim<sup>11</sup>. The protagonists would hardly resist the temptation of resorting to other, more effective means than the logical elegance and persuasive power of their arguments. They would rather do whatever they can to render the arguments of the adversary inconsequential, better still inaudible, and best of all never voiced due to the incapacitation of those who would have voiced them if they could. One argument that will stand the greatest chance of being raised is the ineligibility/incapacity/irrelevance of the adversary as a partner-in-conversation – due to the adversary being inept, deceitful or otherwise unreliable, harbouring ill intentions or altogether inferior and sub-standard.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by Glatzer in *Understanding the Sick and the Healthy*, p. 33, after William James, *Pragmatism*, London 1907, p. 201. The intimate link between Rosenzweig and James’s ideas was first suggested by Ernst Simon in 1953.

<sup>11</sup> Jürgen Habermas observes, correctly, that the expectation of universal consensus is built into any conversation and that without such an expectation communication would be all but inconceivable; what he does not say, though, is that if consensus is believed to be reached in ideal circumstances because of “one and only truth” waiting to be discovered and agreed upon, than something else in “built into” any act of communication: the tendency to render all but one conversationalists together with the variety of views they hold and herald, redundant. Odo Marquard (in *Abschied vom Prinzipiellen*, Philipp Reclam 1991) suggests that by this interpretation ‘undistorted communication’ ideal looks like a posthumous vengeance of solipsism . . .

Were the choice available, refusing conversation or withdrawing from debate would be preferred to the arguing of the case. Entering argument is, after all, an oblique confirmation of the partner's credentials and a promise (even if counterfactually) to follow the rules and the standards of the *lege artis* and *bona fide* discourse. Above all, entering argument means, as Lessing pointed out, commending the truth to God. In more down-to-earth terms, it means making of the outcome of the debate a hostage to the fate. It is safer to declare the adversaries, if possible, a priori wrong, and proceed right away to deprive them of the ability to appeal against the verdict—than attempting to engage in litigation and expose own case to cross-examination, taking therefore the risk of its being disallowed or overturned.

The expedient of disqualifying the adversary from the truth-debate is most often used by the stronger side; not so much because of its particular greater iniquity as due to its greater resourcefulness. We may say that the ability to ignore the adversaries and to close one's ears to the causes they promote is the index by which the relative volumes and power of resources may be measured. Obversely, going back on the refusal to debate and negotiate the truth of the matter is all too often taken for a sign of weakness—a circumstance that makes the stronger (or wishing to demonstrate its superior strength) side yet more reluctant to abandon its rejectionist stance.

On the side of the stronger the refusal to talk may pass for the sign of “being in the right”. For the opposite side, though, the denial of the right to defend its cause which such a refusal entails, and so by proxy the refusal to recognise its right to be listened to and taken seriously as a bearer of human rights, are the ultimate snubs and humiliations—offences that cannot be taken placidly without loss of human dignity . . . It cannot but breed aversion, animosity and dream of revenge. Rejection of Rozenzweig's style “speaking thinking”, the humiliation of denying the partner-in-the-dialogue dignity of a thinking/speaking/listening-to person, has for that reason its own self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing momentum.

### KORCZAK'S PRACTICE—A LABORATORY FOR HUMANITY

Humiliation of the adversary is a powerful weapon; but in addition, it is a boomerang-style weapon. It may be resorted to in order to demonstrate or prove the fundamental and irreconcilable inequality between the humiliating and the humiliated sides; and yet contrary to such intention, it in fact authenticates, verifies their symmetry, sameness, parity

The measure of humiliation invariably involved in every act of a refusal to converse or breaking the conversation is not however the sole reason for the refusal to be self-perpetuating (and so verifying the implausibility of the dialogue). In the frontier-land in which our planet is these days fast turning in the

consequence of a one-sided globalization,<sup>12</sup> repeated attempts to overwhelm, dis-empower and incapacitate the adversary achieve all too often their intended effect, though more often than not with such results as go much beyond the perpetrators' anticipation or, for that matter, their liking. And yet at no other time has the keen search for common humanity, and the practice that follows such an assumption, been as urgent and imperative as it is now. In the era of globalization, the cause and the politics of shared humanity face the most fateful among the many fateful steps they have taken in their long history.

For all its flaws and inadequacies, Korczak's practice of engaged conversation of partners who in the course of talking and listening help each other into equality may be seen, after the years, as a laboratory in which the roads to humanity had been experimented with, researched, and mapped. To say that Korczak added a few (even a crucial few) weapons to our pedagogical armoury while recommending to decommission some others means to grossly underestimate the significance of his legacy. Korczak wished to protect children's dignity not for the sake of the happy childhood alone, but also for the sake of those adults in whom children would eventually turn; it is because of that intention that Korczak found the best way of accomplishing the task in treating children as adults, ideally, should be treated, though all too often are not: to quote Rosenzweig once more, as creatures that have not just ears, but mouths . . . Children's dignity is the childhood of human dignity. Human dignity has no other childhood and nowhere else to take root, grow and self-assert.

"How much one would wish to say of what you do not know, of what so many people do not know, though they no longer are children"—Korczak complained.<sup>13</sup> Given the logic of his ideas, he could say as well 'because' instead of "though". The world of the adults suppresses the inchoate humanity in children, so that children may "mature" into forgetting their early intuitions . . . They won't remember it, let alone know how to practice it, when they need that knowledge, like we do these days, most.

<sup>12</sup> See the chapter "Living and Dying in the Planetary Frontier-Land", in my *Society under Siege*. Polity Press 2002.

<sup>13</sup> Janusz Korczak, *Moski, Joski i Srule*, Warszawa, Oficyna Wydawnicza 1997, p. 71.

