

Culture and Management

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The idea of ‘culture’ was coined and named in the third quarter of the 18th Century, as a shorthand term for the management of human thought and behaviour. ‘Culture’ was not born as a descriptive term, a summary name for the already achieved, observed and recorded regularities of the population-wide conduct (that use of the word ‘culture’ arrived about a century later, when the culture managers looked back on what they already came to view as their creation and following the world-creating God’s example declared it to be good. ‘Culture’ came to mean the way one type of ‘normatively regulated’, regular human conduct differed from another type, under different management) – but as a declaration of *intent*.

The term ‘culture’ entered vocabulary as a name of *purposeful* activity. At the threshold of the modern era men and women, no longer accepted as ‘brute facts’, as links in the chain of Divine (i.e. non-negotiable and not-to-be-meddled-with) creation, indispensable even if mean, paltry and leaving much to be desired, came to be seen as both pliable and in dire need of repair and/or improvement. The term ‘culture’ was conceived inside the family of concepts that included terms like ‘cultivation’, ‘husbandry’, ‘breeding’ – all meaning improvement, prevention of impairment, arresting deterioration. What the farmer did to the seed through attentive care all the way from a seedling to the crop, could and ought to be done to the incipient human beings by education and training. Humans were not *born*, but *made*. They needed yet to *become* human – and in the course of becoming human (a trajectory which they would not negotiate if left to themselves) they had to be guided by other humans, educated and trained in the art of educating and training humans.

‘Culture’ appeared in vocabulary less than a hundred years *after* another crucial modern concept – of ‘managing’, meaning according to OED ‘to cause (persons, animals etc.) to submit to one’s control’, ‘to operate upon’, ‘to succeed in accomplishing’ – and more than a hundred years *earlier* than another, synthesizing sense of ‘management’: ‘to contrive to get along or pull through’. To manage, in a nutshell, meant to get things done in a way onto which they would not move on their own; to *re-direct* events according to one’s design and will. To put it yet another way: to manage (to get control over the flow of events) came to mean the manipulation of probabilities – making certain conduct (openings or responses) of ‘persons, animals etc.’ more likely to take place than it would otherwise have done, while making some other moves utterly unlikely to happen. In the last account, to manage means to limit the freedom of the managed.

Just like ‘agriculture’ is the vision of the field as seen from the perspective of the farmer, ‘culture’ metaphorically applied to humans was the vision of the social world as viewed through the eyes of the ‘farmers of the human-growing fields’ – the managers. The postulate or presumption of management was not a later addition and external intrusion: it has been from the beginning and throughout its history endemic to the concept. Deep in the heart of the ‘culture’ concept lies the premonition or tacit acceptance of an unequal, asymmetrical social relation – the split between acting and bearing the impact of action, between the managers and the managed, the knowing and the ignorant, the refined and the crude.

Theodor Wiesegrund Adorno points out that the ‘inclusion of the objective spirit of an age in the single word “culture” betrays from the onset the administrative view, the task of which, looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize’.¹ And he unpacks the defining traits of that spirit: ‘The demand made by administration upon culture is essentially heteronomous: culture – no matter what form it takes – is to be measured by norms not inherent to it and which have nothing to do with the quality of the object, but rather with some type of abstract standards imposed from without [...]’.² As one could only expect in the case of an asymmetrical social relation, a quite different sight opens to the eyes scanning the relationship from the opposite, receiving end: (in other words, to the eyes of the ‘managed’) and a quite different evaluation is voiced (if people assigned to that end acquire a voice): the sight of an unwarranted and uncalled-for repression, and the verdict of illegitimacy and injustice. In that other version of the relationship’s story, culture appears to be ‘opposed to administration’, since, as Oscar Wilde put it (provocatively, in Adorno’s opinion) – culture is useless (or so it appears as long as the managers hold the monopoly on drawing the line separating use from waste); it represents the claims of the particular against the homogenizing pressure of the general, and it ‘involves an irrevocably critical impulse towards the status quo and all institutions thereof’.³ The clash of the two narratives is inevitable. It can be neither prevented nor pacified once it comes into the open. The managers-managed relationship is intrinsically agonistic; the two sides pursue two opposite purposes and are able to cohabit solely in a conflict-ridden, battle-ready mode.

Adorno recognizes the inevitability of the conflict. But he also points out that the antagonists need each other; however inconvenient and unpleasant the state of overt or clandestine enmity may be, the greatest misfortune that might befall culture is a complete and finite victory over its antagonist: ‘culture suffers damage when it is planned and administrated; if it is left to itself, however, everything cultural threatens not only to lose the possibility of effect, but its very existence as well’.⁴ In these words, he restates the sad conclusion to which he arrived when working (with Max Horkheimer) on *Dialectics of Enlightenment*: that ‘the history of the old religions and schools like that of the modern parties and revolutions’ teaches that the price of survival is ‘the transformation of ideas into domination’.⁵ This lesson of history ought to be particularly diligently studied, absorbed and put into practice by professional ‘culture creators’ who carry the main burden of the transgressive propensity of culture, making it their consciously embraced vocation and practising critique and transgression as their own mode of being:

The appeal to the creators of culture to withdraw from the process of administration and keep distant from it has a hollow ring. Not only would this deprive them of the possibility of earning a living, but also of every effect, every contact between works of art and society, something which the work of greatest integrity cannot do without, if it is not to perish.⁶

The paradox, indeed. Or a vicious circle... Culture cannot live in peace with management, particularly with an obtrusive and insidious management, and most particularly with a management aimed at twisting the culture's exploring/experimenting urge so that it fits into the frame of rationality the managers have drawn. The management's plot against the endemic freedom of culture is a perpetual *casus belli*. On the other hand, however, culture creators need managers if they wish (as most of them, bent on 'improving the world', do) to be seen, heard, listened to and to stand a chance of seeing their task/project through to the completion. Otherwise they risk marginality, impotence and oblivion.

Culture creators have no choice but to live with that paradox. However loudly they protest the managers' pretensions and interference, they would seek a *modus co-vivendi* with administration or sink into irrelevance. They may choose between managements pursuing different purposes and trimming the liberty of cultural creation according to different designs – but certainly not between acceptance and rejection of administration. Not realistically, at any rate.

This is so because the paradox in question stems from the fact that all the mutual mud-slinging notwithstanding, culture creators and managers are bound to share the same household and partake of the same endeavour. Theirs is a *sibling rivalry*. They are both after the same target, sharing the same goal: to make the world different from what it is at the moment and/or from what it is likely to turn into if left alone. Both of them derive from the critique of the *status quo* (even is their declared purposes are to conserve it or to restore it to *status quo ante*). If they quarrel, it is not about whether the world should be an object of constant intervention or left rather to its own inner tendencies – but about the direction which the intervention should take. More often than not their strife is about who is to be in charge; to whom belongs, or ought to be given, the right to decide the direction, and to select the tools with which its pursuit is monitored as well as the measures by which its progress is assessed.

Hannah Arendt spotted flawlessly and spelled out the gist of the conflict:

An object is cultural depending on the duration of its permanence: its durable character is opposed to its functional aspect, that aspect which would make it disappear from the phenomenal world through use and wear and tear [...] Culture finds itself under threat when all objects of the world, produced currently or in the past, are treated solely as functions of the vital social processes – as if they had no other reason but satisfaction of some need – and it does not matter whether the needs in question are elevated or base.⁷

Culture aims above the head of realities of the day. It is not concerned with whatever has been put on the daily agenda and defined as the imperative of the moment – at least it strives to transcend the limiting impact of so defined ‘topicality’ and struggles to free itself of its demands.

Being used/consumed on the spot and dissolving in the process of instantaneous consumption is neither the cultural product’s destination nor the criterion of the cultural object’s value. Arendt would say: culture is after *beauty* – and I suggest that she chose that name for culture’s concerns because the idea of ‘beauty’ is the very epitome of an elusive target that defies rational/causal explanation, has no purpose nor a visible use, serves nothing and cannot legitimate itself by reference to any need already felt, defined and scheduled for gratification. An object is cultural in as far as it outlives any use that might have attended to its creation.

Such an image of culture differs sharply from the common opinion, until recently prevalent also in academic literature – which, on the contrary, casts culture among the homeostatic appliances preserving the monotonous reproduction of social reality, its *mêmeté* – protection and continuation of its sameness over time. The notion of culture common to the writings classified under the rubric of social science has been one of a stabilizing, routine-and-repetition begetting mechanism, an instrument of inertia – not at all the ferment that prevents social reality from standing still and forces it into perpetual self-transcendence as Adorno and Arendt would insist it cannot but be; an element of self-renewing order, rather than of its eternal disruption and overhaul. In orthodox anthropological descriptions (one society = one culture) ‘culture’ appears as an efficient tool of ‘pattern maintenance’, a handmaiden of ‘social structure’ – of a permanent distribution of behavioural probabilities retaining its shape over time and successfully fighting back all occasional breaches of norm, disruptions and deviations threatening to throw the ‘system’ out of its ‘equilibrium’. This is, to be sure, an extrapolation and a utopian horizon of a properly managed (or, to recall Talcott Parsons’s once ubiquitous phrase, ‘principally coordinated’) social totality, with the distribution of probabilities stable and tightly controlled by a set of homeostatic contraptions among which ‘culture’ is assigned the pride of place; a kind of totality inside which any deviant behaviour of human units is promptly spotted, isolated before irreparable harm is done and swiftly defused or eliminated. Inside that vision of the society as a self-equilibrating system (that is, remaining obstinately the same despite the pressures of counter-veiling forces) ‘culture’ *stands for the managers’ dream come true: for an effective resistance to change*. And this is how the role of culture used to be most commonly perceived still two-three decades ago.

Much has happened in those two-three decades, though. To start with, the ‘managerial revolution mark two’, conducted surreptitiously under the banner of ‘neo-liberalism’: managers switching from ‘normative regulation’ to ‘seduction’, from day-to-day policing to PR, and from the stolid, over-regulated, routine-based panoptical model of power to domination through diffuse uncertainty, *precarité* and a continuous though haphazard disruption of routine. And then, gradual dismantling of the state-serviced frame in which the paramount parts of life-politics used to be conducted, and the shifting/drift of life politics onto the domain presided over

by the consumer market that thrives on the frailty of routines and their rapid supercession – rapid enough to prevent their hardening into habits or norms. In this new setting, there is little demand for the bridling and taming of a transgressive urge and of the compulsive experimentation dubbed ‘culture’ in order to harness it to the vehicles of self-equilibration and continuity. Or at least the orthodox carriers of that demand – managers of nation-building states – lost their interest in such harnessing, and the new script-writers and directors of cultural drama wish everything but tamed, regular, routine-bound, inflexible conduct of humans, transformed now into consumers first and last.

With the principal characters of the ‘solid modernity’ drama leaving the stage or reduced to the half-mute role of supernumeraries, and with their replacements reluctant to emerge from the wings, our contemporaries found themselves acting in what can be properly called, following Hannah Arendt, and through her, Bertold Brecht, ‘dark times’. This is how Arendt unpacks the nature and the origins of that darkness:

If it is the function of the public realm to throw light on the affairs of men by providing a space of appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who they are and what they can do, then darkness has come when this light is extinguished by a ‘credibility gap’ and ‘invisible government’, by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet, by exhortations, moral or otherwise, that, under the pretext of upholding old truths, degrade all truth to meaningless triviality.⁸

And this is how she described its consequences:

(T)he public realm has lost the power of illumination which was originally part of its nature. More and more people in the countries of the Western world, which since the decline of the ancient world has regarded freedom from politics as one of the basic freedoms, make use of this freedom and have retreated from the world and their obligations within it [...] But with each such retreat an almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place: what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed between the individual and his fellow men.⁹

Withdrawal from politics and the public realm will turn therefore, wrote Hannah Arendt prophetically, into the ‘basic attitude of the modern individual, who in his alienation from the world can truly reveal himself only in privacy and in the intimacy of face-to face encounters’.¹⁰

It is that newly gained/enforced privacy and the ‘intimacy of face-to-face encounters’, the inseparable companion of ‘dark times’, that is serviced by the consumer market, promoting and thriving on the universal contingency of consumer life; capitalizing on the fluidity of social placements and frailty of human bonds, on the contentious and so

unstable and unpredictable status of individual rights, obligations and commitments, and on the present lying beyond the grasp of its denizens and on the future endemically and incurably uncertain. Under pressure and out of impotence, yet with little resistance (if not willingly), the state managers abandon the ambition of normative regulation for which they once stood accused by Adorno and other critics of the emergent 'fully administered mass society' – putting themselves instead in the 'agentic state' and assuming the role of 'honest brokers' of the market's needs (read: demands).

Culture creators may still resent, and they do resent, the obtrusive intervention of the managers, who insist – true to the managers' habit – on measuring cultural performance by extrinsic criteria, alien to the irrational logic of cultural creativity, and use the power and resources they command to secure obedience to the rules they set. This principal objection to interference is not however, as it has been argued before, a novel departure – but just another chapter in a long story of 'sibling rivalry' with no end in sight: for better or worse, for better *and* worse, cultural creations need managers – lest they should die in the same ivory tower in which they had been conceived...

What is truly novel are the *criteria* which the present-day managers, in their new role of agents of the market forces rather than of the nation-building state powers, deploy to assess, 'audit', 'monitor', judge, censure, reward and punish their wards. Naturally, they are the consumer-market criteria, such as set preference for instant consumption, instant gratification and instant profit. A consumer market catering for long-term needs, not to mention eternity, would be a contradiction in terms. Consumer market propagates rapid circulation, shorter distance from use to waste and waste disposal, and immediate replacement of no longer profitable goods. All that stands in a jarring opposition to the nature of cultural creation. And so the novelty is the parting of ways of the siblings still engaged in rivalry. The stake of the new chapter of the age-long tug-of-war is not only the answer to the question 'who is in charge?', but the sheer substance of 'being in charge' – its purpose and its consequences. We may go a step (a small step, as it were) further and say that the stake is the survival of culture as we came to know it since the Altamira caves had been painted. Can culture survive the demise of infinity – that first 'collateral casualty' of the consumer market's triumph? The answer to that question is that we don't truly know – though we may have valid reasons to suspect a 'no' answer, and following Hans Jonas's advice to the denizens of the 'era of uncertainty' we may put more trust in the oracles of the 'prophets of doom'...

To subordinate cultural creativity to the criteria of the consumer market means to demand of cultural creations that they accept the prerequisite of all would-be consumer products: that they legitimize themselves in terms of market value (and their *current* market value, to be sure) or perish.

The first question addressed to cultural offers claiming validity and bidding for recognition is that of sufficient demand, supported with adequate capacity to pay. Let us note that consumer demand being notoriously capricious, freak and volatile, the records of consumer-market's rule over culture are full of mistaken prognoses, wide-of-the-mark evaluations and grossly incorrect decisions. In practice, that rule

boils down to compensating the absent quality analysis with the overshooting of potential targets and the hedging of bets – in other words, with wasteful excess and excessive waste (G.B. Shaw, a dedicated amateur-photographer in addition to his play-writing, advised photographers to follow the example of codfish that must spawn a thousand eggs so that one mature codfish can be hatched; it seems that the whole consumer industry, and the marketing managers keeping it alive, follow Shaw's advise). Such a strategy may sometimes insure against the exorbitant losses caused by mistaken cost-effects analysis; it would however do little or nothing to assure that cultural products stand a chance of revealing their true quality when no market demand for them is in sight (an eminently *short* sight, given the endemic 'short-termism' of the calculations).

It is now the prospective clients, their numbers and the volume of cash at their disposal that decide (though unknowingly) the fate of cultural creations. The line dividing the 'successful' (and therefore commanding public attention) cultural products from failed cultural products (that is, unable to break through into notoriety) is drawn by sales, ratings and box-office returns (according to Daniel J. Boorstin's witty definitions, 'celebrity is a person who is known for his well-knownness', while 'a best seller' is a book which somehow sold well 'simply because it was selling well'.¹¹ Let me add that chequebook journalism would take care of the close link between the two rules). But there is no correlation that the theorists and critics of contemporary art managed to establish between the virtues of a cultural creation and its celebrity status. If a correlation is to be found, it will be found between celebrity status and the power of the brand that lifted the incipient *objet d'art* from obscurity into the limelight. The contemporary equivalent of good fortune or a stroke of luck is Charles Saatchi stopping his car in front of an obscure side-street shop selling bric-a-brac, dreamed/craved by the obscure side-street persons who made them, to be proclaimed works of art. They will turn into works of art, and overnight, once they are put on display in the gallery whose walls and entry gates separate the good art from bad, and art from non-art. The name of the gallery lends its glory to the names of the artists on exhibition. In the vexingly confusing world of flexible norms and floating values, this is – not unexpectedly – a universal trend. As Naomi Klein succinctly put it: 'many of today's best-known manufacturers no longer produce products and advertise them, but rather buy products and "brand" them'.¹² Brand and the logo attached (it is the shopping bag with the name of the gallery that gives meaning to the purchases inside) do not add value – they are value, the market value, and thus value as such.

It is not just the companies that lend value to products through branding (or devalue the products by withdrawing their logo). Perhaps the most potent brands are events: celebrated events, massively attended thanks to being known for their well-knownness and selling masses of tickets because of the tickets being known to sell well. 'Events' are better than the other brands counting on the loyalty of the faithful attuned to the notoriously short span of public memory and the cut-throat competition between allures vying for the consumers' attention. Events, like all *bona fide* consumer products, bear a 'use-by' date; their designers and supervisors may leave the long-term concerns out of their calculation (with a double benefit of huge savings and confidence-inspiring resonance with the spirit of the age), planning and catering for (to recall George Steiner's apt phrase) 'maximal impact and instant obsolescence'. Again, the (literally

and metaphorically) spectacular career of the fixed-time event, as the most felicitous and ever more often employed form of branding, chimes well with the universal tendency of the liquid-modern setting. Cultural products – whether inanimate objects or educated humans, tend to be enlisted in the service of ‘projects’, admittedly one-off and short lived undertakings. And, as the research team quoted by Naomi Klein found out: ‘you can indeed brand not only sand, but also wheat, beef, brick, metals, concrete, chemicals, corn grits and an endless variety of commodities, traditionally considered immune to the process’,¹³ that are believed (wrongly, as it transpires) to be able to stand on their own feet and prove their point just by unfolding and demonstrating their own excellence.

‘Consumerist syndrome’ applied to culture centres on an emphatic denial of the virtue of procrastination, of the ‘delay of satisfaction’ precept – those foundational principles of the ‘society of producers’ or ‘productivist society’.

In the inherited hierarchy of recognized values, ‘consumerist syndrome’ has dethroned duration and elevated transience. It has put the value of novelty above that of the lasting. It has radically shortened the time-span separating not just the want from its fulfilment (as many observers, inspired or misled by credit agencies, suggested), but also the usefulness and desirability of possessions from their uselessness and rejection; the life-expectation of the ‘fulfilling capacity’ of acquisitions has fallen dramatically. Among the objects of human desire, ‘consumerist syndrome’ put appropriation (quickly followed by waste-disposal) in place of possessions. Among human preoccupations, it put the precautions against things (animate as much as inanimate) ‘outstaying their welcome’ well in front of the technique of ‘holding fast’, of staying put and of the long-term (not to mention interminable) engagement. It also shortened drastically the life-expectation of desire, the time distance from desire to its gratification and from gratification to the waste-disposal tip. Let me restate the point: ‘consumerist syndrome’ is all about speed, excess and waste; about precepts diametrically opposed to those guiding cultural creativity.

Of course, it would be as unjust as it is unwise to accuse the consumer industry, and consumer industry alone, of the plight in which cultural creation finds itself today. That industry is well geared to the form of life which I used to call ‘liquid modernity’.¹⁴ That industry and that form of life are attuned to each other and reinforce each other’s grip on the choices men and women of our times may realistically make.

As the great Italian sociologist, Alberto Melucci, used to say – ‘we are plagued by the fragility of the presentness which calls for a firm foundation where none exists’.¹⁵ And so, ‘when contemplating change, we are always torn between desire and fear, between anticipation and uncertainty’.¹⁶ This is it: *uncertainty*. Or, as Ulrich Beck prefers to call it, the *risk*: that unwanted, awkward and vexing, but perpetual and un-detachable fellow-traveller (or a stalker rather?!) of all anticipation – a sinister spectre haunting the decision-makers that we all, whether we like it or not, are. For us, as Melucci pithily put it, ‘choice became a destiny’.¹⁷

Indeed, everything around in the ‘really existing world’ seems to be but ‘until further notice’. The allegedly rock-solid companies are unmasked as figments of accountants’

imagination. Whatever is commended as ‘meat for you’ today may be reclassified tomorrow as poison. Apparently firm commitments and solemnly signed agreements may be overturned overnight. And promises, or most of them, seem to be made in order to be un-kept and betrayed. There seems to be no stable, secure island among the tides. To quote Melucci once more: ‘we no longer possess a home; we are repeatedly called upon to build and then rebuild one, like the three little pigs of the fairy tale, or we have to carry it along with us on our backs like snails’.¹⁸ To sum it all up: at no other time has Robert Louis Stevenson’s memorable verdict ‘to travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive’ sounded truer than it does in our floating and flowing, fluid modern world.

When destinations move or lose their charm faster than legs can walk, cars ride or planes fly, keeping on the move matters more than the destination. The question ‘*how* to do it’ looks more important and urgent than the query ‘*what* to do’. Not to make a habit of anything practised at the moment, not to be tied up by the legacy of one’s own past, wearing current identity as one wears shirts that can be replaced when falling out of use or out of fashion, rejecting past lessons and abandoning past skills with no inhibition or regret – are all becoming the hallmarks of the present-day, liquid-modern life politics and attributes of liquid-modern rationality. Liquid-modern culture feels no longer a culture of learning and accumulating like those cultures recorded in the historians’ and ethnographers’ reports. It looks instead a *culture of disengagement, discontinuity, and forgetting*.

That last phrase – is it not a contradiction in terms? This is the big question, perhaps the life-and-death question as far as culture is concerned. For centuries culture lived in an uneasy symbiosis with management, tussling uncomfortably, sometimes suffocating, in the managers’ embrace – but also running to the managers for shelter and emerging reinvigorated and strengthened from the encounter. Would culture survive the change of management? Won’t it be allowed anything but a butterfly-like, ephemeral existence? Won’t the new management, true to the new management style, limit its wardenship to asset-stripping? Won’t the cemetery of deceased or aborted ‘cultural events’ replace the rising slope as a fitful metaphor of culture?

William de Kooning suggests that in this world of ours ‘content is a glimpse’, a fugitive vision, a look in passing.¹⁹ While a most incisive analyst of the twists and turns of postmodern and post-postmodern culture, Yves Michaud suggests that aesthetics, culture’s forever elusive and stubbornly pursued target, is these days consumed and celebrated in a world emptied, and void, of the works of art²⁰...

Notes

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Culture and Administration’, trans. Wes Blomster, in J.M. Bernstein [ed], *The Culture Industry: Selected essays on Mass Culture by Theodor W. Adorno* (London: Routledge, 1991), p.93. Let me point out that the word ‘management’ better than ‘administration’ conveys the gist of the German term *Verwaltung* used in the original.

² Adorno, ‘Culture and Administration’, p.98.

³ Adorno, ‘Culture and Administration’, pp.93, 98, 100.

⁴ Adorno, ‘Culture and Administration’, p.94.

⁵ Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1979), pp.216–7.

⁶ Adorno, 'Culture and Administration', p.103.

⁷ Hannah Arendt, *La crise de la culture* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), pp.266–7.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1983), p.VIII.

⁹ Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, pp.4–5.

¹⁰ Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, p.24.

¹¹ Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America* (New York: Atheneum, 1962), p.61.

¹² Naomi Klein, *No Logo* (London: Flamingo, 2001), p.5.

¹³ Klein, *No Logo*, p.25.

¹⁴ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

¹⁵ See Alberto Melucci, *The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.43ff. This is an extended version of the Italian original published in 1991 under the title *Il gioco dell'io*.

¹⁶ Melucci, *The Playing Self*, p.43.

¹⁷ Melucci, *The Playing Self*, p.43.

¹⁸ Melucci, *The Playing Self*, p.43.

¹⁹ W. De Kooning, *Écrits et propos* (Paris: Éditions de l'Ensb-a, 1992), pp.90ff.

²⁰ Yves Michaud, *L'art à l'état gazeux* (Paris: Stock, 2003), p.9.

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